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Abstract
This paper responds critically and synthetically to forgoing papers by Kevin Jung, Robert Segal,
and Stephen Bush. Placing their respective arguments into conversation helpfully illuminates the
methodological multidimensionality and improvisational character of Geertz’s account of interpre-
tation and explanation. I argue that these features of Geertz’s work enable it to simultaneously
attend to meaning, power, identity, and experience in understanding and assessing religious prac-
tices and cultural formations.
The above papers complementarily raise questions, criticisms, and open potentially fruitful
paths for developing Geertz’s work in the study of religion. Lee gives us a paper with a
two-fold objective. The first explicates thick description’s compatibility with Donald
Davidson’s conception of ‘‘radical interpretation.’’ The second is a constructive gesture
toward a ‘‘normative theory of religion’’ constructed in terms of Geertz’s account of ethos
and worldview. I focus on Lee’s first objective, briefly positioning it amid several impor-
tant conversations in the study of religion. I then invite Lee to think a bit more specifically
about the difference it makes to read Geertz with Davidsonian eyes. Segal’s contribution
challenges the tendency to pigeonhole Geertz as concerned solely with the interpretation
of meanings in contrast to explanation. He demonstrates how Geerz subverts such a
dichotomy by innovatively integrating both interpretation and explanation. Bush takes
issue both with those who think that Geertz might accommodate attention to power anal-
ysis, and challenges Talal Asad’s widely influential criticisms of Geertz (Asad 1993).1
The papers by Segal and Bush speak to one another provocatively. After inviting Lee
to expand upon his central claims, I place the latter two papers into conversation, letting
the tensions between them emerge. I then demonstrate how an accurate grasp of Geertz’s
approach to the study of culture (and religion as a cultural ‘‘system,’’ in particular)
requires recognizing his approach as not simply non-reductionist, but positively eclec-
tic—even improvisational—in the methodological categories that he deploys. Because of
this, I argue, Geertz’s analytical approach is quite capable of discerning and critically
interrogating dimensions of both meaning and power in ritual and symbolic practices,
and in cultural systems more broadly.
What’s the Use in Calling Geertz a Davidsonian?
Lee provides a corrective repositioning of Geertz in a provocative conversation in the
areas of theory and method of the study of religion (Frankenberry 2002). Many scholars
of religion have been persuaded that Donald Davidson’s work helps defuse the conceptual
scheme relativism according to which normative judgments or truth claims about the
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world will be relative to the conceptual scheme within which those claims are made
(Bowlin & Stromberg 1997; Davidson 2001). Some read Geertz as an exponent of
the very ‘‘conceptual scheme’’ analysis (and thus liable to the kind of relativism) that
Davidson overturns (Godlove 1997, 74–84). Lee not only resists this positioning of Ge-
ertz, he claims that a particularly productive way of describing Geertz’s project is to read
it as a variety of Davidsonian ‘‘radical interpretation.’’ If he succeeds, Lee will have cor-
rected the tendency to lump Geertz under the category of ‘‘scheme-content dualism,’’
correspondence theory, and cognitivism about belief.
According to Lee, charges that Geertz is a representationalist and adheres to a corre-
spondence theory of truth not only obscure the contours of his work, but that such
charges are tenable only insofar as one reads Geertz in an entirely uncharitable way (5).
Lee makes this point quite persuasively, in my judgment. And yet, it is important to keep
in mind that, reading Geertz charitably, and redescribing him in Davidsonian terms, are
two different things. The question arises: what does reading Geertz as a Davidsonian get
you that a more charitable (perhaps simply more accurate) reading of Geertz does not?
What new light does it shed on Geertz’s work? What does it further enable a Geertz-
inspired ethnographer, cultural analyst, or scholar of religion to do? Does it expand or
enrich the purposes and analytical power of thick description in any way? This is, I think,
what Geertz would want to know. Does Lee’s account push Geertz’s work in potentially
constructive directions among cultural theorists and philosophers of religion?
Bush sets out to understand how it is, precisely, that meaning and power are, as Geertz
claimed late in his career, ‘‘hopelessly entangled’’ and ‘‘mutually implicative’’ (Geertz
2000, 184). Bush then compares Geertz and Talal Asad’s positions on the complex inter-
relation of meaning and power in the study of cultural formations. He finds things to
puzzle over on both sides. It turns out, as Bush exposes in a particularly deft move,
Asad’s refusal of symbolic meaning in favor of power—power understood as the opera-
tion of ‘‘disciplinary and coercive practices’’ in ‘‘shaping subjects,’’ forming selves, and
‘‘constituting hierarchies’’—implicates Asad in a bit of self-deception. As Bush concludes,
‘‘the view that sees religion as power is committed to a view of religion as meaning’’ (3).
Bush’s claim about the enmeshment of meaning and power appears consistent with
Geertz’s claim that meaning and power are ‘‘hopelessly entangled’’ and ‘‘mutually impli-
cative.’’ Bush argues that this is not what Geertz means. In fact, he argues that Geertz’s
approach to symbolic meaning is ‘‘not suitable for the analysis of power.’’ As Bush has it,
power analysts focus upon the socialization of persons into ‘‘particular habits that dispose
them to feel, desire, perceive, and comport themselves in determinate ways.’’ It is crucial
to note, on Bush’s account, this shaping of habits and dispositions is something of which
the subject cannot be consciously aware (4). For Geertz, by contrast, as Bush reads him,
symbol-users will be aware of the meanings of the symbols that they use. This categori-
cally distinguishes Geertz’s concern with meanings from concerns about power. ‘‘The
meaning of the symbol, ‘is the meaning particular social actions have for the actors whose
actions they are’, Geertz says’’ (Geertz 1973, 27, Bush’s italics). This reading emphasizes
that the Geertzian anthropologist is charged with the task of ‘‘reading the culture ‘over
the shoulders’ of whose cultures it is.’’ According to Bush’s gloss of these lines from
Geertz, ‘‘If you asked them what a ritual, gesture, or term meant, they would be able to
tell you’’ (4). Here the papers by Segal and Bush begin to speak to one another in a
particularly instructive way.
Segal says clearly from the start that interpretation may be interpretation of how things
are from the actor’s point of view. This does not mean that the meaning identified and
described will be one that the actor will consciously recognize or endorse. As Segal puts
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it, ‘‘Even if an interpretation is necessarily from the actor’s point of view, it need not be
limited to the actor’s conscious point of view. The meaning found by interpreters are
commonly ones of which the actor is unaware’’ (2). At the same time, Segal cautions,
explanation need not necessarily depart from what the religious adherent or actor would
recognize or accept. Segal emphasizes the fact that the Geertzian anthropologist does not
peer over the shoulder of her subjects and record what they understand themselves to be
up to purely and simply. Such analysis contains this as a central element, to be sure. Geertz
does say, for instance, that thickly descriptive interpretations aim to be ‘‘actor oriented.’’
But he is careful to properly understand what it means, and does not mean, to say this.
Segal suggests that an account that limits meanings to those of which the actor consciously
aware (especially understood in terms of what the actor would be able to tell the analyst,
or even willingly endorse) is too thin an account of meaning and interpretation for Geertz.
Segal’s reading points us to the fact that, for the Geertzian ethnographer, the cultural
contexts and social actions being described are ensembles of texts, which are themselves
ensembles. In ‘‘straining to read over the shoulder’’ of his or her subjects, the ethnographer
aims to construct a reading of a manuscript that is ‘‘foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoher-
encies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries…’’ (Geertz 1973, p. 10).
The meaning—even actor oriented meaning—may well overrun what any particular actor
takes the meaning of a social action or symbol to be. Geertz expresses the complex inter-
relation of interpretation and explanation in his discussion of the ethnographer’s uses of
‘‘experience near’’ and ‘‘experience distant’’ concepts (Geertz 1983, p. 57).
‘‘Experience near’’ refers to the concepts that a subject of study or ‘‘native informant’’
might ‘‘naturally and effortlessly’’ use to tell one what he understands himself and his com-
patriots to be up to—what they ‘‘see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and which he would
readily understand when similarly applied by others’’ (Geertz 1983). ‘‘Experience distant’’
concepts are those categories that the cultural analyst or specialist brings to bear in the pro-
cess of constructing a reading of, and extrapolating from, what one’s native informants
understand themselves to be doing.2 Geertz is emphatic that ‘‘you don’t have to be one to
know one.’’ In other words, the ethnographer should avoid attempting to think like,
‘‘achieve communion with,’’ or step into the shoes of her subjects. Nor should the analyst
privilege by default reports from their point of view. The analyst’s challenge, rather, is to
artfully and generatively integrate experience-near and experience-distant concepts:
[To] produce an interpretation of the way a people lives which is neither imprisoned in their
mental horizons, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a witch, nor systematically deaf to
the distinctive tonalities of their existence, an ethnography of witchcraft as written by a geome-
ter (Geertz 1983, p. 57).
This task requires a charitable grasp of the uses of concepts native to the context under
analysis, as well as placing those concepts in ‘‘illuminating connections with experience
distant’’ concepts (Geertz 1983, 58). ‘‘The trick is to figure out what the devil they think
they are up to,’’ Geertz says, in a line that appears to vindicate Bush’s claim about the
subject’s conscious awareness of meaning as the object of Geertzian analysis. ‘‘In one
sense of course no one knows this better than they do themselves.’’ But Geertz then cru-
cially pivots away from this claim, adding, ‘‘But in another sense, that simple truism is
simply not true.’’ He continues:
People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, un-self-consciously, as it were colloquially;
they do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any ‘concepts’ involved
at all. That is what experience-near means—that ideas and the realities they inform are naturally
and indissolubly bound up together’’ (58).
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This un-self-consciousness—perhaps implicit or practical grasp of experience-near
concepts—is consistent with Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between ‘‘knowing how’’ and
‘‘knowing that,’’ which was so influential for Geertz (Geertz 1973; Chaps. 1, 2; Ryle
1949; Chap. 2). In as far as a symbol is ‘‘a vehicle for a conception’’ in a ritual act or
symbolic practice, average, ordinary, everyday practitioners might use the symbol cor-
rectly, adeptly—even with a degree of practical excellence—but perhaps not be able to
state what the conception ‘‘contained’’ in the symbol is. If pressed, he or she might offer
a gloss of the symbol’s meaning that is erroneous. Ryle’s example is of a boy who learns
to play chess, and plays correctly and deftly on the basis of observation and repeated par-
ticipation in this propriety-laden activity, yet without ever having read or heard—or
being able to explicitly articulate—the formal rules of the game. Perhaps more plausibly,
some participant in a ritual or symbolic practice, when pressed to state explicitly what her
actions or use of a symbol ‘‘mean’’ to some enquiring ethnographer, might reply, ‘‘this is
simply what we do.’’ It is in their use that symbols have their life, Geertz says (following
Wittgenstein), not in the native’s conscious explication of their use. To confine the inter-
pretation of meaning of the symbols to what the native reflectively thinks and can articu-
late runs into what Geertz calls ‘‘psychologism’’—‘‘the other great saboteur of cultural
analysis.’’ Geertz uses the term ‘‘thinking’’ to refer to ‘‘intelligent activity of any sort, and
‘meaning’ to refer not just to abstract ‘concepts’ but significance of any sort’’ (Geertz
1973; p. 405, n. 44, echoing Ryle 2009).
The distinction and dialectical relation between ‘‘experience near’’ and ‘‘experience
distant’’ concepts suggests how a Geertz-inspired analyst might make sense of and say
something analytically illuminating about (to take Bush’s example) a group of boys out
on a playground overheard to repeatedly shout at one another the phrase, ‘‘Dude, you
throw like a girl!’’ If the analyst directly asked them what this phrase ‘‘means,’’ they
might very well report that girls throw in a particular way, and that their friend, though
a boy, throws like that—‘‘like a girl.’’ In principle, nothing prohibits the Geertzian ana-
lyst in question from employing ‘‘experience distant’’ concepts (such as those Bush identi-
fies in Iris Marion Young’s work, for instance) with which the ethnographer would
construct a reading of the situation that illuminates broader cultural presuppositions and
implications of the phrases’ meaning in that context. Such a reading might propose, for
instance, ‘‘The boys and girls in this context are acculturated and habituated so as to
physically comport themselves in different ways (i.e. timidly vs. assertively). Moreover,
they are socialized so as not to recognize this as a contingent process of socialization (say,
the internalization of certain culturally articulated dispositions and habits) that could be
otherwise, but rather, as something essential and self-evident to ‘being a girl’ in contrast
to ‘being a boy’.’’ Moreover, the analyst might read such uses of the phrase as not only
reflecting the shaping and forming of selves, but as further perpetuating perceptions,
experiences, acceptable forms of bodily comportment and behavioral patterns. Such a
reading is fully consistent with Geertz’s description of the disposition-forming impact that
cultural systems exert upon the formation of persons.3
All this suggests that Segal is on to something important in Geertz when he says that
thickly describing what social actions mean at a given place and time is not confined to
significances of which the actors are consciously aware. It suggests, moreover, that impor-
tant elements of the descriptive flexibility and critical potential of what Geertz means by
‘‘meaning’’ get washed out when Bush ascribes to Geertz the claim that ‘‘The meaning
of the symbol’ ‘is the meaning particular social actions have for the actors whose actions
they are’,’’ and glosses that to mean ‘‘If you asked them what a ritual, gesture, or term
meant, they would be able to tell you’’ (4).
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Bush pushes the case that Geertz cannot account for social-structural operations of
power—and how they manifest themselves in the shaping and forming of selves, in
particular—because Geertz makes the statement that ‘‘culture is not a power’’ in the sense
that it does not ‘‘cause behavior.’’ This claim comes from a passage in which Geertz says this:
‘‘As interworked systems of construable signs, culture is not a power, something to which
social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context,
something within which they can be intelligently—that is, thickly—described’’ (Geertz
1973, p. 14). Bush is right to carefully puzzle over this passage, because if it means what it
appears to say (Bush helpfully illustrates with his own example of ethnic conflict in Rwanda),
then Geertz’s approach conflicts with the nature of practical reasoning (Bush, 6). Moreover,
if we read this line as severing belief from behavior, then we find Geertz in a self-contradic-
tory bind. What, for instance, are we to make of the many passages in which Geertz identi-
fies the function and impact of cultural systems—and, in particular, the ways that religious
symbols, meanings and practices exert themselves by synthesizing worldview (beliefs) and
ethos (a group’s way of life)—as uniquely and powerfully motivating behavior, namely, that
they ‘‘establish powerful, pervasive, long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic]?’’4
Here again Bush’s and Segal’s papers converse instructively, and a clarifying tension
begins to emerge. Segal calls attention to Max Weber’s influence upon Geertz’s account
of culture, particularly for understanding the practical impact of dispositions, moods and
motivations which religious symbol systems cultivate and evoke (11–12). Acknowledging
his debt to Weber, Geertz describes humans as meaning-making animals suspended in
webs of significance they themselves have spun. Geertz takes ‘‘cultures’’ to be those webs
of meaning into which humans find themselves suspended (Geertz 1968; p. 99; 1973,
p. 5). No particular individual spins these ‘‘webs,’’ Segal points out. For those caught up
in those webs of significance identified as ‘‘religious,’’ the ‘‘symbol systems’’ in question
evoke certain powerful, long-lasting moods and motivations by synthesizing worldview
and ethos. Generally, cultural patterns ‘‘institute …social and psychological processes
which shape public behavior’’ (92). Religious symbol systems shape public behavior in
especially profound (Geertz says ‘‘coercive’’) ways. ‘‘[R]eligion, by fusing ethos and world
view, gives to a set of social values what they perhaps most need to be coercive: an
appearance of objectivity. In sacred rituals and myths values are portrayed not as subjec-
tive human preferences but as imposed conditions for life implicit in a world with a par-
ticular structure’’ (Geertz 1973, 131).
It would appear that Geertz is caught in a particularly glaring self-contradiction. On
one hand, he asserts that ‘‘culture does not cause behavior.’’ Three essays further in the
same book he argues that religious cultural systems influence—at times coercively—‘‘a
chronic character to the flow of his activity and the quality of his experience’’ (95). Bush
sharpens the risk entailed in this contradiction. If Geertz indeed subscribes to the apparent
claim that ‘‘culture does not cause behavior,’’ then he has taken up an understanding of
culture that ‘‘conflicts with the nature of practical reasoning’’ (6)—a defective and self-
defeating position indeed.
There may be a way to read these lines that resolves their apparent contradictoriness
without either ascribing to Geertz a fairly flagrant self-contradiction, or reading him as
denying the nature of practical reasoning. Read with careful attention to its context, the
phrase ‘‘culture does not cause behavior’’ appears in the transitional paragraphs following
Section III of ‘‘Thick Description,’’ where Geertz overviews the predominant theoretical
tendencies in the study of culture at the time he was writing (i.e. the ‘‘theoretical mud-
dlement in contemporary anthropology’’ (Geertz 1973, p. 11). Here he introduces his
own ‘‘semiotic concept of culture’’ as an alternative that renders irrelevant (according to
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Geertz) the regnant debates over whether ‘‘culture’’ is ‘‘subjective’’ vs. ‘‘objective,’’
‘‘patterned conduct’’ vs. ‘‘a frame of mind’’ (or some combination of the two), as well as
all of the labeling that accompanied these (‘‘idealist!’’—‘‘materialist!’’; ‘‘mentalist!’’—
‘‘behaviorist!’’; ‘‘impressionist!’’—‘‘positivist!’’). The prevailing temptations amidst these
debates are to either reify ‘‘culture’’ (to make it, as Geertz said, a ‘‘ ‘super-organic’ reality
with forces and purposes of its own’’), or reduce it to ‘‘a brute pattern of behavioral
events’’ (Geertz 1973, pp. 10–11). In short, here Geertz is conducting a theoretical
ground-clearing exercise of sorts. His assertions that ‘‘culture is not a power’’ and does
not ‘‘cause behavior’’ (among other things he says that culture is not, and does not do, in
these passages) counters accounts that reify ‘‘culture’’—that construe it as a ‘‘reality with
force and purposes of its own,’’ and thus as a causal determinant of behavior. On this
reading, Geertz’s denial that culture ‘‘causes behavior’’ is indexed to a context-specific
deterministic conception of culture that he is rejecting and countering (i.e. culture as ‘‘a
power,’’ and the accompanying fallacy of reification). This refusal is consistent with his
further claim that ‘‘culture’’ is more like a context within which behavior can be
described. Following Weber, cultural systems are like ‘‘webs of meaning’’ that fill out
those contexts, and acculturation into those contexts shapes and forms behavior by inclin-
ing or disposing people to behave in certain ways (i.e. cultivating dispositions, sensibili-
ties, proclivities, tendencies and habits in them).5
On my proposed reading, the impact of the ethos ⁄worldview synthesis through reli-
gious symbol systems does not exert ‘‘coercive’’ force as a distinct causal mechanism dic-
tating behavior or directly causing any specific action. It would not, to apply it to Bush’s
apt example, dictate that the machete-clenched hand of the Rwandan Hutu reach out
and cleave the skull of his Tutsi next door neighbor. However, it would, under the right
circumstances, dispose, incline, or make the Hutu likely to behave in that way (i.e. cir-
cumstances where, for instance, the cultural significances and historical invidiousness of
Hutu and Tutsi identity-associated dispositions or proclivities had been brought to the
surface, aggravated, manipulated, mobilized and whipped into frenzy for religious- and ⁄or
ethno-nationalist purposes, so as to inspire violence and even genocide). In fact, on the
reading I am proposing, the Rwandan genocide is a case for which Geertz’s thickly
descriptive approach powerfully illuminates the multiple, inter-penetrating layers of
nationalist, ethnic, tribal, historical, colonialist sources of the moods, motivations, sensibil-
ities, and social significances that shaped behavior generally in that context, and which, as
a historical matter of fact, were mobilized and manipulated in ways that ended in one
group perpetrating genocidal acts upon the other. Read in context, both Geertz’s seem-
ing self-contradiction about the impact of culture upon behavior, and the possible impli-
cation that he denies the basic character of practical reasoning, melt into air.
Meaning and Power: Hopelessly Entangled and Mutually Implicative
It is a demonstration of the substance and acuity of their respective assessments that sparks
fly when Bush’s and Segal’s papers are read alongside each other. A pivotal insight that
emerges from this encounter is the extent to which Geertz is intentionally eclectic and
integrative methodologically, and self-reflectively non-reductive. Grasping what Geertz
means when he describes meaning and power as entangled and ‘‘mutually implicative’’
becomes a matter of paying careful attention to the context in which that claim appears.
To offer the full quotation: ‘‘In what we are pleased to call the real world, ‘‘meaning,’’
‘‘identity,’’ ‘‘power,’’ and ‘‘experience’’ are hopelessly entangled, mutually implicative,
and ‘‘religion’’ can no more be founded upon or reduced to the last, that is,
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‘‘experience,’’ than it can to any of the others’’ (Geertz 2000, 184). This claim follows
several pages of textured description and explication of the revival of the practice of
wearing jilbab among younger, urban, mainly college-educated women in Java—women
who had grown up in largely ‘‘religiously undutiful households,’’ but who, for various
reasons, came to embrace the practice.
The jilbab, he explains, is a piece of Islamic dress: ‘‘a long, loose-fitting, monochrome
gown, reaching to the ankles, designed to conceal the shape of the body, and a long
winding scarf, usually white, designed to conceal the hair and neck’’ (Geertz 2000,
p. 180). Geertz begins with reports elicited in direct interviews with the women in ques-
tion (Brenner 1996). What on the surface are accounts of personal experience and private
motivations for changing their dress (i.e. what, in effect, adopting jilbab ‘‘means’’ to each
them) are, in fact, implicated in a broad array of interconnected meanings, social relations,
and behavioral implications. When thickly described, what appears to the naked eye as
merely a ‘‘change of dress’’ for intensely personal religious reasons (the addition of ‘‘a few
meters of chiffon’’ in the words of France’s Stasi Commission report), is redescribed by
Geertz as effecting ‘‘a change of the way of being in the world’’ (Geertz 2000, 184).
What does Geertz mean by that? His description illuminates a complex of contextual
forces that impact the women in ways that actually transforms their experiences of the
world around them, and in ways that over-run the conceptions of ‘‘personal religious
experience’’ they invoke. This complex of forces alters what the women do with their
bodies, how they are treated, and what is done to them. Some of these forces are
reported directly by the women in interviews and conversations—usually reflecting the
dictates of religious commitment and the impact of personal religious experience. Other
of these forces are illuminated thematically through third-person analysis of the personal
narratives. The latter betray motives and behavioral implications that are not simply
‘‘religious,’’ nor fully recognized by the interviewees.
Geertz aims to illustrate how William James’ account of ‘‘religious experience,’’ in
effect, provides an ‘‘experience-distant’’ concept that helps make sense of and analyze
what the women describe in terms of ‘‘experience near’’ concepts (namely, intensely per-
sonal, deeply private, experience). The bodily practice of wearing jilbab shapes the
women’s social roles, as well as the ways they are perceived and treated. It shapes and
forms the ways they experience the world around them, the ways they experience them-
selves—what they feel and perceive.
Geertz concludes that James’s conception of religious experience remains an illuminat-
ing analytical lens for explicating the significance of these cases. And yet, he cautions that
the description of this simply in terms of personal religious experience (experience simpli-
citer) would be intrinsically incomplete if it reduced to the women’s reports of their expe-
riences. In short, he thinks that James really must be supplemented by Weber—and in
particular, ‘‘the Weberian interworking of religious convictions and practical actions,’’ or
as Geertz restates it, ‘‘the impartibility of belief and behavior’’ (Geertz 2000, p. 179).
Likewise, the analysis would be intrinsically incomplete it were reduced to some other
category—whether identity, or power, or meaning. These categories are, rather, ‘‘hope-
lessly entangled, mutually implicative’’ (184).
Now, is this ‘‘power analysis’’ per se? Clearly, too much would be lost in calling it sim-
ply that. That is Geertz’s point. Equally clearly, however, attending to and illuminating
the formation and habituation of selves, the inter-woven-ness of bodily practices with the
constitution and transformation of experience, and all of this through the sociality and
coerciveness of acculturation into religious symbol systems—these are things that thick
description is capable of attending to, and ostensibly, attending to critically and reflectively.
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To apply any one of the analytical concepts that he identifies as indispensable (identity,
experience, power, meaning) in abstraction from the others, or reductionistically, would
result in a truncated analysis.
Construed narrowly and in abstraction, Geertz castigated ‘‘power analysis’’—power
conceived as ‘‘some sort of featureless, universal force producing an abstract, invariant
relationship called ‘domination’….’’ (Geertz 1995, p. 40). Such analytical framing ‘‘blocks
perception’’ and leaves the analyst with ‘‘the dim banalities of theory.’’6 Of course, the
definition of power analysis that Geertz rejects is one that Michel Foucault himself came
to reject.7 It is instructive that Foucault came to reject the definition of ‘‘power’’ that his
work had been saddled with in a way quite similar to Geertz’s disavowel of a ‘‘theory of
meaning’’ that had come to be identified with his work.8 Further realizing their analytical
and critical potential for the study of religion requires overcoming precisely such conve-
niently compartmentalized understandings of them. What Geertz models is an approach
that is intentionally non-reductive, eclectic in theoretical appropriations, and improvisa-
tional in employing those appropriations. The challenge is to explore and expand upon
the descriptive and critical possibilities contained therein. I am pleased to have the oppor-
tunity to respond to papers that aid in bringing this pivotal, indispensable, and unfortu-
nately much neglected, task to the fore.
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of persons, specific sorts of individuals.’’ Having glossed how these might create and reinforce social stratification, he
continues, ‘‘The everyday world in which the members of any community move, their taken-for-granted field of social
action, is populated not by anybodies, but by somebodies, concrete classes of determinate persons positively character-
ized and appropriately labeled. And the symbol systems which define these classes are not given in the nature of
things—they are historically constructed, socially maintained, and individually applied’’ (Geertz 1973, 363).
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4 ‘‘A motivation is a persisting tendency, a chronic inclination to perform certain sorts of acts and experience cer-
tain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of situations, the ‘sorts’ being commonly very heterogenous and rather ill-
defined classes in all three cases’’ (Geertz 1973, p. 96).
5 To be a smoker, to use one of Geertz’s examples on this point, is not necessarily to engage in the act of smoking
at any determinate moment. It is to have become dispositionally inclined to smoke; to have a proclivity to smoke;
to be ‘‘in the habit of smoking,’’ and thus, inclined to behave in contextually situated ways that are interwoven
with such habits and dispositions (running to the food-mart to pick up a fresh pack, fumbling for matches, keeping
up with lighters and breath spray, averting ‘‘nicotine fits,’’ sitting in a glass-enclosed cage at the airport, huddling
outside non-smoking building entryways during heavy rain or the dead of winter) (Geertz 1973, p. 95).
6 When asked how he would respond to Asad’s critique of his work, Geertz said he suspected that Asad was a
‘‘power reductionist.’’ When asked if, in opposition to Asad, he viewed meaning as prior to power, Geertz replied,
‘‘No. I just do not think that power has any independent existence outside of a cultural or historical context’’ (Mic-
heelson 2002, p. 9).
7 Alexander Nehamas has demonstrated that, in his later work, Foucault came to view the formation of the self as
a way that the relations of power could be reflected upon critically, and even positively utilized (Foucault 1997, pp.
315–6; Nehamas 1998, chap. 6). Hubert Dreyfus claims that Geertz’s account of the Balinese cockfight illuminates
precisely such background constitutional conditions, and functions to further produce the collective understandings
that are lived out in the taken-for-granted daily life of Balinese society (Dreyfus 1993, pp. 353–4). See also the
instructive exchange between Joseph Rouse and Hubert Dreyfus (2000), and Springs (2009).
8 Foucault states, ‘‘[T]he claim that ‘you see power everywhere, thus there is no room for freedom’ seems to me
absolutely inadequate. The idea that power is a system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room
for freedom cannot be attributed to me’’ (Foucault 1997, p. 293). Geertz says, ‘‘I do not think meanings are out
there to theorize about. One tries to look at behavior, what people say, and make sense of it—that is my theoretical
approach to meaning’’ (Micheelson 2002, 6).
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